Difference between revisions of "40 Internet Security Threats"
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40 Internet Security Threats David J. Stang, Ph.D. With every passing day, we witness a huge increase in interest in Internet access, sometimes called the "information highway". The public is now aware of the Internet as a source of valuable information. We now have a glut of books on how to use the Internet. There is a surge in the number of new Internet users, new addresses, and sales of hardware and software to permit Internet access. We are also witnessing a general awakening to an understanding that there are security problems that might result when connecting to the Internet. While the public seems aware that such problems exist, very few people have any detailed knowledge of what the problems are. Many now think they should buy a firewall to prevent such problems. They think that firewalls are generic things, like fire extinguishers, that probably all are about equally effective, and that with a firewall installed, they will have dealt with the Internet security problems they have heard of. Users are headed for trouble if they continue to believe this. There are a wide variety of problems. Most firewalls don't stop a fraction of them. Firewalls differ so widely in what they can do that they hardly deserve to be grouped together under the same name. In this technical report, we will not tackle the entire problem of Internet security. Rather, we will focus on a manageable set of issues: What are the some of the security problems that can arise with an Internet connection? What are the kinds of technology available that might help with such problems? Your internal network is potentially vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks from the outside. Here are some examples, each of which you might ask your firewall to defend you against. Most of the attacks are described in more detail in Cheswick & Bellovin. We use published descriptions of attacks and provide fairly little information about each, in an effort to minimize the "training" that this report might provide to attackers. Our intent is to show the wide array of mechanisms by which an attacker can get into your kitchen, living room, and bedroom. Here is a short list of just 40 vulnerabilities: 1.Attacks via password guessing. Guessable passwords (such as "service" as a password for an account named "field", or the default passwords provided at installation time) can defeat nearly any system, and are the most common means by which a system is penetrated. A proper firewall should establish the non-guessability of all passwords used by the system it is protecting. It should also provide additional authentication mechanisms, such as authenticating both machine (Ethernet address, for instance) and user. It should also limit the number of login attempts, to prevent unlimited guessing. 2.Brute force password guessing Password guessing attacks on the encrypted password file (/etc/passwd) will normally succeed when the attacker uses a hacking tool such as CRACK and the file has a sufficient number of names in it. Some of these attacks can extract as many as 25% of the passwords in the file, some of which will be useful in entering other systems. A good firewall protects the password file, and prevents its transmission or alteration. 3.Tapping terminal sessions Tapping terminal sessions is a technique in which the attacker merely monitors an active user, capturing their keystrokes and looking for a login to another system. Such attacks are possible with the default configuration of even "secure" versions of UNIX, such as OSF/1. 4.Keystroke capture of password via TSRKeystroke capture of password via TSR can be done with any number of hacker tools such as THIEF or GETIT or even Borland's SUPERKEY. With this attack, the hacker is likely to need to be able to later access the local drive to pick up the file containing the captured keystrokes. 5.A sequence number attack occurs when a hacker predicts the target's choice of starting points, places such an origin in the IP source address, and then engages any protocol that uses this address for authentication (such as the r commands in UNIX). A firewall might be expected to prevent such an attack by a more secure authentication of the source. 6.Spoofing UDP packets is easy for an attacker if your applications use the User Datagram Protocol to transmit information. UDP does not use handshaking or sequence numbers, and sends all packets for a given port to the same process, regardless of source address or port number. A firewall might be expected to independently verify the source of a UDP packet before processing it, even if the source is internal to the organization. 7.Tearing down ICMP connectionsTearing down ICMP connections. The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is a mechanism that informs hosts of better routing, terminates connections when network problems arise and can report routing troubles. Older versions ignore the connection-specific information of an ICMP message, and may redirect all connections between a pair of hosts, replacing the original connection with a new one. Hacking tools to tear down connections using this technique are available to the underground. 8.Redirecting ICMP connections ICMP messages can be redirected, establishing routing between a new pair of hosts. Many routers will respond to such instructions, though they should be set to do no such thing! A proper firewall design would respond to these instructions only when its own trusted router provides the request. 9.Loose Source Route option attacksLoose Source Route option attacks require that the hacker initiates a TCP connection, specifying an explicit path to the destination. When it sees that this procedure is being used, the destination uses the inverse of the path if the source is trusted (source becomes destination), conforming to RFC 1122. This permits any attacker to impersonate a trusted machine. Independent authentication by a proper firewall can defeat this approach. 10.Bogus Routing Information Protocol attacks insert additional RIP packets into a network. If the attacker is closer to the target than the original source, traffic is diverted to the attacker. In some implementations of RIP, there is no authentication field and no dialog between pairs of hosts to establish authenticity. In such a case, it is possible for the attacker to provide the host with a host-specific route, making this attack more difficult to detect. 11.Zone transfer attack. The Domain Name System (DNS) is a distributed database that maps host name and IP addresses. TCP queries by backup servers can produce zone transfers, in which a full copy of a portion of the name space is produced, so that the backup server can do its job. In a zone transfer attack, hackers can make similar requests of DNS, obtaining a list of potential target hosts and IP addresses. 12.Inverse mapping tree attack In many systems, the DNS permits subtrees to be stored on other servers. Because DNS maintains pairs of trees one mapping host names to addresses, and the other mapping addresses to names an attacker can modify an inverse record to show the name of a trusted host, the address of the attacker. Then, by using rlogin, the attacker may be able to convince your machine that it is a trusted host. A firewall might be able to prevent such an inverse mapping tree attack if it protected the DNS or performed more thorough authentication by checking IP addresses. 13.DNS cache attacks. In all but the most recent versions of DNS, it is possible to pre-contaminate the cache of DNS responses, then initiate the call. When the target checks the cache of valid responses, it then finds a name match and permits the attack. A firewall must use both name-based and address-based authentication, if it is to be trusted. 14.DNS Resolver attacksDNS Resolver attacks exploit a weakness in DNS resolvers in which, to be more efficient, the resolver is willing to connect to destinations in which the match on domain names is incomplete. Thus a domain with a name in common with a name in a desired destination address might be able to intercept traffic intended for another destination. 15.SMTP overload attacks. The Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) provides a simple set of rules for transporting 7-bit messages. The protocol can be imitated easily, and because there is no authentication, messages can be entered manually by an attacker. Because an attacker can manually specify any source for the mail, it is possible for an attacker to overload the system with bogus messages, creating a denial of service attack. In such an attack, the mail system loses functionality, even if the host doesn't collapse under the weight of the bogus incoming messages. 16.Alias Expansion. SMTP permits aliases to be used when transmitting mail. But commands such as vrfy may translate mail aliases to login names, and expn expand mailing list aliases. A firewall should ensure that expansion of aliases to names is done inside the organization, to preserve the confidentiality of those who use the system. 17.sendmail attacks. sendmail is the most common means by which SMTP is implemented, and with thousands of lines of code, there are many bugs. Root is no place to run such a documentedly-dangerous program! sendmail need not run as root unless it is doing local delivery on gateway machines. Alternatives to sendmail are available, including potentially safer front-ends to it. 18.MIME header attacks. A mailer on a machine receiving mail that has been encoded with MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) might be expected to carry out the instructions in the header of the MIME message. Such instructions, if not carefully evaluated before execution, can overwrite .rhosts in the current directory and perform other forms of mischief. 19.Executables attached to mail. If the mail system can be entered by an attacker who can forge a message, then the attacker won't have difficulty attaching a program to the mail. The program can be designed to do anything the attacker wishes, and is likely to be successful with this Trojan if it appears to do something useful for the recipient. The Trojan, for instance, might seek to capture passwords as a TSR, or might merely contain a virus not detected by the recipient's virus scanner. Sometimes the Trojan is a "dropper" a program containing a virus. The program and virus are usually encrypted, to prevent a scanner from detecting the virus; when the program is run, the virus is released to infect files, or is placed in a sector, where it will execute with the next boot. Trojans and droppers do not require a deliberate attack, of course: they can be attached to E-mail by well-meaning senders who are unaware of the hidden contents of the program they send. 20.Attacks via corrupted telnet. telnet provides a user with terminal access. In an unsecure system, the telnet program can be compromised by an attacker to capture user name, password, or even the entire terminal session. Alternatively, if the attacker is not interested in what you are doing, but rather wishes to have the access offered by your account, the attacker's telnet replacement can simply keep the connection open after you think you've logged out. 21.Tapping the communications link. When any portion of a communications link is tapped, unencrypted passwords cannot be trusted. Often the easiest place to attack a communications link is a tap on its backbone. 22.NTP attacks. When an authentication service is time-sensitive, so that a different value for authentication is used at each different time, an attacker has an opportunity to capture what was used for authentication as well as the time of authentication, then attempt to instruct the host via the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to set the time back to the captured authentication string's valid time, then simply playback the captured authentication string. Such NTP attacks are not absolutely prevented by the latest versions of NTP. 23.finger attacks. The finger protocol provides information on users that is quite useful to attackers, including their name, electronic mail address, when the account was last used, where the user last connected from, idle periods, unread mail, etc. Attackers appreciate finger for its help in identifying relatively unused accounts and the match between names and mail addresses handy for password guessing. finger is a dangerous service, far less secure than whois. 24.Forging UNIX authentication fields in RPC headers. RPC (Sun's Remote Procedure Call) is a protocol that provides a designer with the means of creating a network service which can reach out and make subroutine calls to remote servers. Every RPC message has a header which can include authentication information. The information might be "null", for anonymous services, or might include "UNIX authentication" information, including the supposed numeric user id and group id of the caller and the name of the calling machine. All of the information in these fields can be readily forged by an attacker, and the RPC request can essentially ask for any service available on the host. 25.Portmapper denial of service attacks. Portmapper helps connect RPC clients and servers, and uses RPC for its work. One call supported by portmapper is to unregister a service. Because portmapper does not do much to authenticate such a request, portmapper denial of service attacks are straight-forward. 26.Portmapper reports to attackers via rpcinfo. Portmapper will also provide information on each service the server is running, including its protocol (e.g., UDP or TCP), its port number, and its version number. An attacker's work is easier after they obtain this information with rpcinfo. 27.Attacks using portmapper to hide source location. Use of RPC normally requires that a roundtrip of messages is required to determine the real port number of the client/source/attacker. To save this trip, portmapper permits the source to request that it transfer its request to the target server, carrying portmapper's own return address, rather than the actual source's. This ability makes legitimate local requests indistinguishable from those made by outside callers. While some versions of portmapper can do their own filtering, many cannot. 28.NIS attacks which obtain the password file, host address table, or public and private key databases. Network Information Services (NIS, formerly known as YP or Yellow Pages) is a service that distributes many important databases from a central server to its clients. Such databases include the password file, the host address table, and public and private key databases used for Secure RPC. This attack instructs NIS to transfer one or more of these key files to the attacker. 29.Attacks impersonating NIS backup servers NIS clients can be told to use a different NIS server, should it go down; the replacement server can be fraudulent, and supply false /etc/passwd file entries, false host addresses, etc. 30.RPC attacks on the NIS shadow password file. A shadow password file is a hidden copy of the password file which holds the actual, unencrypted passwords. An attacker is unlikely to be able to access this file directory, but can make repeated requests for RPC services using a variety of passwords. Applications check this file for the password, and report back to the attacker whether the password is valid. RPC does not log flurries of requests for passwords. 31.Attacks using NFS root file handles. To mount a volume for a client, a server running NFS (Network File System) the RPC mount daemon at the NFS server asks the client for name and requested file system, examines an administrator-supplied list, and if the client is on the list, sends the client the file handle for the root directory. The client maintains this file handle, and uses it in subsequent requests. If the client keeps the handle (e.g., records it for later use) the client has permanent access to that root. Root file handles can be shared, and once a user is given a root file handle, there is no mechanism for later taking it back. Considering the many problems that can occur in managing NFS, secure alternatives such as the Andrew File System (AFS) should be considered. AFS uses Kerberos for its authentication and provides a single scalable, global, location-independent file system. Files can reside anywhere in the network, with caching occurring transparently. 32.Attacks via tftp. The Trivial File Transport Protocol is a UDP-based file transfer mechanism which does not support authentication at all. If tftp is not restricted to just one or two directories, then attacks on the password file are simple. 33.Attacks using anonymous ftp. FTP (File Transfer Protocol) is a program and file distribution system that rivals e-mail for importance on the Internet. Anonymous ftp permits any caller to transfer files from a restricted area of the host without providing any further authorization. If ftp is set up so that a file or directory in the anonymous ftp area is writable or owned by the ftp login, then an attacker can use ftp to write a file named .rhosts to ftp's home directory, then use that file to authorize an rsh connection to the target machine as ftp. From there, the attacker proceeds to transfer files. 34.Anonymous ftp captures of /etc/passwd/etc/passwd. If you happen to leave the /etc/passwd file in an area reachable by anonymous ftp, assume a visitor will help themselves to a copy. 35.Undesirable files placed in the publicly writable anonymous ftp directory. If you have an area where anonymous ftp callers can place files, you should assume that this area will sooner or later hold copies of pirated, pornographic, slanderous, or virus-infected files. Such files may be placed their for your own amusement, for the "benefit" of those within your organization, or simply for others witting or unwitting to come and collect. 36.Denial of service by filling the publicly writable anonymous ftp. If a caller can place files on your system anonymously, it may be a matter of time before some caller places an expanding file there that fills the available space. Such a project will potentially disable any audit trail, slow other processes (or down the system), and, at a minimum, deny additional callers write-access to this directory. 37.Anonymous ftp attacks by replacement of commands within the ftp area. Any program such as ls which resides in the ftp area can be potentially replaced by an attacker, subsequently resulting in unexpected and undesired results. 38.Attacks with rlogin. rlogin permits login to a remote machine without a password if a few simple conditions are met: the caller must be listed in the destination's lists of trusted callers (such as /etc/hosts.equiv or $HOME/.rhosts), the caller must come through a privileged TCP port, and usually the caller's name must correspond to the caller's IP address. Both users and hackers like rlogin. Users like it because it does not require password entry, permits them to access other remote machines by simply adding them to the user's personal .rhosts file, and seems to work fine. Attackers like it because all they need to do is drop a file listing them as authorized in /etc/hosts.equiv, /usr/spool/uucppublic, /usr/ftp, etc. After they have gotten in with rlogin, they can capture lists of other trusting machines from /etc/hosts.equiv and other files, and from there explore many other machines. 39.Attack X11 servers. X11 is the most popular windowing system on the Internet. The system treats the user of it as a server, and permits applications to interact with it. An application is able to track keystrokes, capture screens, simulate keystrokes, etc. The main protection of most X11 servers is that they only permit certain machines to make requests of them. X11 servers are typically not notified of denied access requests, nor can they verify what process is using them. Attackers anywhere on the Internet can find and control all unprotected X11 servers. 40.Tunneling and encapsulation. If you run a firewall that only permits certain protocols, other protocols will be able to pass through if they are encapsulated within approved protocols, unless you examine the contents of each packet before it is permitted to pass through the firewall. Once a tunnel has been constructed between a "mole" inside your organization and a party outside your organization, bidirectional tunnel traffic will not be impaired by your firewall. Last Revised Wednesday April 16, 1997. Please direct questions or problems regarding this web site to our Webmaster. Š 1997 Seven Locks Software, Inc. All rights reserved. Legal Notices.